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العربيةShare EBS snapshot out
Can share an EBS snapshot out to an attacker account.
Grants escalation on its own.
ec2:ModifySnapshotAttributeOn its own, ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute can share an EBS snapshot out to an attacker account. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute on the snapshot to add an attacker-controlled account to its createVolumePermission, sharing a full disk copy out of the account. This bypasses every control on the live volume: the attacker restores the snapshot in their own account and reads it at leisure.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1537, Transfer Data to Cloud Account, under the exfiltration tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as ModifySnapshotAttribute. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
ModifySnapshotAttributePrerequisites
ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute on the snapshot.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1537 · Transfer Data to Cloud AccountTactic
Exfiltration
A control that would remove it: Restrict ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute; deny createVolumePermission changes via SCP/policy.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute allow?
Can share an EBS snapshot out to an attacker account.
Can ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.
How is share EBS snapshot out detected?
Watch for ModifySnapshotAttribute in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute; deny createVolumePermission changes via SCP/policy. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1537, Transfer Data to Cloud Account, under the exfiltration tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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