English
Español
Français
Deutsch
日本語
한국어
العربيةPoison an ECR image a privileged Lambda/ECS workload runs
Can push a malicious image to a repo a privileged Lambda/ECS workload pulls, poisoning its next launch.
Grants escalation on its own.
ecr:PutImageOn its own, ecr:PutImage can push a malicious image to a repo a privileged Lambda/ECS workload pulls, poisoning its next launch. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call ecr:PutImage to push a malicious image to a repository that the repository's workload pulls from; on the workload's next image pull the attacker's image runs as the repository. Because the graph shows the current binding - not the future pull - this is a speculative artifact-poisoning finding: it bites when the consumer re-pulls (an ECS relaunch on a mutable tag; a Lambda redeploy).
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1525, Implant Internal Image, under the persistence tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as PutImage. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
PutImagePrerequisites
ecr:PutImage on a repository whose image is currently run by a privileged Lambda function or ECS task; the consumer must re-pull (mutable tag / relaunch) for the poison to take effect.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1525 · Implant Internal ImageTactic
Persistence
A control that would remove it: Restrict ecr:PutImage on this repo; pin consumers to immutable digests; enable ECR tag immutability; scan images before deploy.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does ecr:PutImage allow?
Can push a malicious image to a repo a privileged Lambda/ECS workload pulls, poisoning its next launch.
Can ecr:PutImage escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.
How is poison an ECR image a privileged Lambda/ECS workload runs detected?
Watch for PutImage in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict ecr:PutImage on this repo; pin consumers to immutable digests; enable ECR tag immutability; scan images before deploy. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1525, Implant Internal Image, under the persistence tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.