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Attack paths Compliance How it works Attack map Pricing Blog
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The Pathbreak Attack Map for AWS / ECS
Privilege escalation ECS T1651

Open ECS Exec shell

Can open an interactive ECS Exec shell inside a running container.

Grants escalation on its own.

ecs:ExecuteCommand
Key takeaway

On its own, ecs:ExecuteCommand can open an interactive ECS Exec shell inside a running container. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.

ExecuteCommand as the role 01 Attacker principal 02 Interactive session 03 Administrator
How an attacker moves from this permission.
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Why it is dangerous

A principal can call ecs:ExecuteCommand to open an interactive shell inside running the container via ECS Exec, no SSH key, no open security-group port, no iam:PassRole, bypassing the network path entirely. That yields code execution inside the container, from which the principal can read the task role's temporary credentials from the ECS task-metadata endpoint and pivot further into the account.

In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1651, Cloud Administration Command, under the lateral movement tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as ExecuteCommand. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.

Detection

ExecuteCommand

Prerequisites

Target task is RUNNING with enableExecuteCommand=true and carries a task or execution role.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1651 · Cloud Administration Command

Tactic

Lateral Movement

Breaking the path

A control that would remove it: Restrict ecs:ExecuteCommand to break-glass principals; disable ECS Exec (enableExecuteCommand=false) on tasks that don't need it.

Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.

Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.

Questions

What does ecs:ExecuteCommand allow?

Can open an interactive ECS Exec shell inside a running container.

Can ecs:ExecuteCommand escalate privileges on its own?

Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.

How is open ECS Exec shell detected?

Watch for ExecuteCommand in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.

How do you break this path?

A control that would remove it is: Restrict ecs:ExecuteCommand to break-glass principals; disable ECS Exec (enableExecuteCommand=false) on tasks that don't need it. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.

Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?

T1651, Cloud Administration Command, under the lateral movement tactic.

Related paths

Same servicePass role to App Runneriam:PassRoleSame servicePass role to ECS serviceiam:PassRoleSame servicePass role to ECS taskiam:PassRoleSame servicePass role to ECS task (RunTask override)iam:PassRoleSame servicePass role to ECS task (StartTask override)iam:PassRoleSame servicePass role to ECS task on EC2iam:PassRole

References

  • https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651/

Find this in your own account

We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.

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Validated AWS attack paths, and the change that breaks each one.

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