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العربيةHijack CloudFormation stack role via change set
Can execute a malicious change set on a stack as its existing service role.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
cloudformation:CreateChangeSetcloudformation:ExecuteChangeSetcloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet can execute a malicious change set on a stack as its existing service role, but only when it is held together with cloudformation:CreateChangeSet. Held together they reach administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call cloudformation:CreateChangeSet and cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet on an existing CloudFormation stack that already carries the service role. By staging a modified template as a change set and executing it, the principal makes CloudFormation apply the attacker's changes using the target role, no iam:PassRole needed, because the target role is already bound to the stack. A privileged service role means the attacker's template can provision admin resources: full privilege escalation against a stack that was already trusted.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateChangeSet, ExecuteChangeSet. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
CreateChangeSetExecuteChangeSetPrerequisites
An existing stack that has a service role attached; permission to create and execute a change set on it.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1578 · Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict cloudformation:CreateChangeSet/ExecuteChangeSet on stacks that carry a privileged service role.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet allow?
Can execute a malicious change set on a stack as its existing service role.
What else is needed for cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with cloudformation:CreateChangeSet. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is hijack CloudFormation stack role via change set detected?
Watch for CreateChangeSet, ExecuteChangeSet in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict cloudformation:CreateChangeSet/ExecuteChangeSet on stacks that carry a privileged service role. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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