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العربيةHijack CloudFormation stack role
Can update a stack's template and run changes as its existing service role.
Grants escalation on its own.
cloudformation:UpdateStackOn its own, cloudformation:UpdateStack can update a stack's template and run changes as its existing service role. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call cloudformation:UpdateStack on the target role, which already carries a privileged service role. By pushing a modified template, the principal makes CloudFormation execute its changes using the target role's existing service role, no iam:PassRole needed, because the role is already bound to the stack. A privileged service role means the attacker's template can provision admin resources: full privilege escalation.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as UpdateStack. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
UpdateStackPrerequisites
An existing stack that has a service role attached; permission to update it.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1578 · Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict cloudformation:UpdateStack on stacks that carry a privileged service role.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does cloudformation:UpdateStack allow?
Can update a stack's template and run changes as its existing service role.
Can cloudformation:UpdateStack escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is hijack CloudFormation stack role detected?
Watch for UpdateStack in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict cloudformation:UpdateStack on stacks that carry a privileged service role. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.