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العربيةEnroll attacker MFA on user
Can enroll an attacker-controlled MFA device on a user.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
iam:CreateVirtualMFADeviceiam:EnableMFADeviceiam:EnableMFADevice can enroll an attacker-controlled MFA device on a user, but only when it is held together with iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice. Held together they reach a standing way back in.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice then iam:EnableMFADevice to bind an attacker-controlled MFA device to the user, establishing persistence that survives credential rotation.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098.005, Account Manipulation: Device Registration, under the persistence tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
CreateVirtualMFADeviceEnableMFADevicePrerequisites
iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice + iam:EnableMFADevice on the user.
Tactic
Persistence
A control that would remove it: Remove iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice / iam:EnableMFADevice from the principal; alarm on new MFA enrolments.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:EnableMFADevice allow?
Can enroll an attacker-controlled MFA device on a user.
What else is needed for iam:EnableMFADevice to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is enroll attacker MFA on user detected?
Watch for CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice / iam:EnableMFADevice from the principal; alarm on new MFA enrolments. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098.005, Account Manipulation: Device Registration, under the persistence tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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