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The Pathbreak Attack Map for AWS / KMS
Data access KMS T1552

Decrypt with KMS key

Can decrypt ciphertext protected by a KMS key.

Grants escalation on its own.

kms:Decrypt
Key takeaway

On its own, kms:Decrypt can decrypt ciphertext protected by a KMS key. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches the data itself.

Decrypt reads data 01 Attacker principal 02 Data store 03 Data read
How an attacker moves from this permission.
Explore this in Pathbreak

Why it is dangerous

A principal can call kms:Decrypt with the key, verified against both the principal's identity policy and the key's key policy. The key is a gatekeeper: decrypt access unlocks every ciphertext the key protects (encrypted secrets, volumes, snapshots, S3 objects), so control of the key amplifies into control of all the data it gates.

In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1552, Unsecured Credentials, under the credential access tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as Decrypt. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.

Detection

Decrypt

Prerequisites

kms:Decrypt on the key (from identity OR the key policy) plus possession of (or access to) the ciphertext.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1552 · Unsecured Credentials

Tactic

Credential Access

Breaking the path

A control that would remove it: Tighten the KMS key policy and the principal's kms:Decrypt; use grants/least-privilege key policies.

Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.

Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.

Questions

What does kms:Decrypt allow?

Can decrypt ciphertext protected by a KMS key.

Can kms:Decrypt escalate privileges on its own?

Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches the data itself with no other permission.

How is decrypt with KMS key detected?

Watch for Decrypt in CloudTrail. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.

How do you break this path?

A control that would remove it is: Tighten the KMS key policy and the principal's kms:Decrypt; use grants/least-privilege key policies. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.

Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?

T1552, Unsecured Credentials, under the credential access tactic.

Related paths

Same techniqueRead CloudWatch log eventslogs:GetLogEventsSame serviceSelf-grant KMS Decrypt via grantkms:CreateGrantSame serviceSelf-grant KMS decrypt via key policykms:PutKeyPolicySame serviceDecrypt with a KMS key granted to an external AWS accountKMSSame serviceSchedule KMS key deletionkms:ScheduleKeyDeletion

References

  • https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/

Find this in your own account

We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.

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