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العربيةRead CloudWatch log events
Can read the stored log events of a CloudWatch log group.
Grants escalation on its own.
logs:GetLogEventsOn its own, logs:GetLogEvents can read the stored log events of a CloudWatch log group. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches the data itself.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call logs:GetLogEvents to read the stored log events of CloudWatch log the group. Application and platform logs routinely contain access keys, bearer tokens, database connection strings and PII printed by careless code, so reading them is direct data exfiltration and, when a long-term credential is present, a pivot to whatever identity it belongs to. CloudWatch Logs is a public-endpoint, IAM-gated API, so this is a control-plane read with no network precondition; severity tracks the log group's sensitivity.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1552, Unsecured Credentials, under the credential access tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as GetLogEvents, FilterLogEvents, GetQueryResults. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.
Detection
GetLogEventsFilterLogEventsGetQueryResultsPrerequisites
logs:GetLogEvents (or FilterLogEvents/GetQueryResults) on the log group; logs:Unmask additionally to defeat a data-protection masking policy. CloudWatch Logs has no resource policy, so identity-policy access alone suffices.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1552 · Unsecured CredentialsTactic
Credential Access
A control that would remove it: Restrict logs:GetLogEvents/FilterLogEvents/GetQueryResults to the principals that need them; scrub credentials/PII from logs and enable a CloudWatch Logs data-protection policy.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does logs:GetLogEvents allow?
Can read the stored log events of a CloudWatch log group.
Can logs:GetLogEvents escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches the data itself with no other permission.
How is read CloudWatch log events detected?
Watch for GetLogEvents, FilterLogEvents, GetQueryResults in CloudTrail. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict logs:GetLogEvents/FilterLogEvents/GetQueryResults to the principals that need them; scrub credentials/PII from logs and enable a CloudWatch Logs data-protection policy. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1552, Unsecured Credentials, under the credential access tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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