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العربيةDelete CloudWatch log group
Can destroy a log group and everything stored in it.
Grants escalation on its own.
logs:DeleteLogGroupOn its own, logs:DeleteLogGroup can destroy a log group and everything stored in it. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call logs:DeleteLogGroup on the group, deleting the group and all stored events - useful both to erase traces and to remove application/VPC/Lambda telemetry going forward. DeleteSubscriptionFilter and DeleteRetentionPolicy are quieter variants of the same lever.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1562.008, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs, under the defense evasion tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as DeleteLogGroup. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
DeleteLogGroupPrerequisites
logs:DeleteLogGroup on the log group.
Tactic
Defense Evasion
A control that would remove it: Restrict logs:DeleteLogGroup to a break-glass role; deny via SCP and alarm on the event.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does logs:DeleteLogGroup allow?
Can destroy a log group and everything stored in it.
Can logs:DeleteLogGroup escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails with no other permission.
How is delete CloudWatch log group detected?
Watch for DeleteLogGroup in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict logs:DeleteLogGroup to a break-glass role; deny via SCP and alarm on the event. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1562.008, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs, under the defense evasion tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.