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العربيةNarrow CloudTrail event selectors
Can strip management/data events from a trail while leaving it enabled.
Grants escalation on its own.
cloudtrail:PutEventSelectorsOn its own, cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors can strip management/data events from a trail while leaving it enabled. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors on the trail to remove management or data event recording. Stealthier than StopLogging: the trail stays enabled and looks healthy on a console review, but the events the attacker cares about are no longer captured.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1562.008, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs, under the defense evasion tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as PutEventSelectors. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.
Detection
PutEventSelectorsPrerequisites
cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors on the trail.
Tactic
Defense Evasion
A control that would remove it: Restrict cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors to a break-glass role; deny org-wide via SCP and alarm on the event.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors allow?
Can strip management/data events from a trail while leaving it enabled.
Can cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails with no other permission.
How is narrow CloudTrail event selectors detected?
Watch for PutEventSelectors in CloudTrail. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors to a break-glass role; deny org-wide via SCP and alarm on the event. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1562.008, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs, under the defense evasion tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.