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العربيةStop CloudTrail logging
Can stop a CloudTrail trail from recording API activity.
Grants escalation on its own.
cloudtrail:StopLoggingOn its own, cloudtrail:StopLogging can stop a CloudTrail trail from recording API activity. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call cloudtrail:StopLogging on the trail, halting management- and data-event recording without deleting anything. The trail still exists and still looks configured, so the gap is easy to miss on a console review, and every action the attacker takes afterwards goes unrecorded in that trail.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1562.008, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs, under the defense evasion tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as StopLogging. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
Detection
StopLoggingPrerequisites
cloudtrail:StopLogging on the trail. An organization trail can only be stopped from the management account.
Tactic
Defense Evasion
A control that would remove it: Restrict cloudtrail:StopLogging to a break-glass role; deny it org-wide via SCP and alarm on the event.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does cloudtrail:StopLogging allow?
Can stop a CloudTrail trail from recording API activity.
Can cloudtrail:StopLogging escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails with no other permission.
How is stop CloudTrail logging detected?
Watch for StopLogging in CloudTrail. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict cloudtrail:StopLogging to a break-glass role; deny it org-wide via SCP and alarm on the event. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1562.008, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs, under the defense evasion tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.