Invoke Lambda (run as its role)
Can invoke a Lambda function and run it as its execution role.
Grants escalation on its own.
lambda:InvokeFunctionOn its own, lambda:InvokeFunction can invoke a Lambda function and run it as its execution role. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call lambda:InvokeFunction on the function, verified against both the principal's identity policy and the function's resource (invoke) policy. The function runs as its execution role, so invoking it is code execution as that role, the function is not the prize but a hinge: the chain continues to the role it surrenders (lambda-cred-theft) and everything that role can reach.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1648, Serverless Execution, under the execution tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as Invoke. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
InvokePrerequisites
lambda:InvokeFunction on the function (from identity OR the function's resource policy).
MITRE ATT&CK
T1648 · Serverless ExecutionTactic
Execution
A control that would remove it: Scope lambda:InvokeFunction and the function's resource policy; least-privilege the execution role.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does lambda:InvokeFunction allow?
Can invoke a Lambda function and run it as its execution role.
Can lambda:InvokeFunction escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is invoke Lambda (run as its role) detected?
Watch for Invoke in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Scope lambda:InvokeFunction and the function's resource policy; least-privilege the execution role. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1648, Serverless Execution, under the execution tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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