Privilege escalation SageMaker T1648

Pass role to SageMaker model endpoint

Can pass a role into a SageMaker model+endpoint and run an attacker container as it.

Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:

iam:PassRolesagemaker:CreateModelsagemaker:CreateEndpointConfigsagemaker:CreateEndpoint
Key takeaway

iam:PassRole can pass a role into a SageMaker model+endpoint and run an attacker container as it, but only when it is held together with sagemaker:CreateModel, sagemaker:CreateEndpointConfig, sagemaker:CreateEndpoint. Held together they reach administrator access.

CreateModel iam:PassRole runs as role 01 Attacker principal 02 New SageMaker 03 Passed role 04 Administrator
How an attacker moves from this permission.
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Why it is dangerous

A principal can call sagemaker:CreateModel passing the execution role with an attacker-controlled container image, then CreateEndpointConfig + CreateEndpoint to run it. The container executes as the target role and can exfiltrate its credentials.

In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1648, Serverless Execution, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateModel, CreateEndpoint. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.

Detection

CreateModelCreateEndpoint

Prerequisites

iam:PassRole for a role trusting sagemaker.amazonaws.com and the sagemaker create actions.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1648 · Serverless Execution

Tactic

Privilege Escalation

Breaking the path

A control that would remove it: Scope iam:PassRole for roles trusting sagemaker.amazonaws.com; restrict sagemaker:CreateModel.

Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.

Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.

Questions

What does iam:PassRole allow?

Can pass a role into a SageMaker model+endpoint and run an attacker container as it.

What else is needed for iam:PassRole to be dangerous?

It becomes an escalation only when held together with sagemaker:CreateModel, sagemaker:CreateEndpointConfig, sagemaker:CreateEndpoint. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.

How is pass role to SageMaker model endpoint detected?

Watch for CreateModel, CreateEndpoint in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.

How do you break this path?

A control that would remove it is: Scope iam:PassRole for roles trusting sagemaker.amazonaws.com; restrict sagemaker:CreateModel. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.

Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?

T1648, Serverless Execution, under the privilege escalation tactic.

Related paths

Same servicePass role to SageMaker tuning jobiam:PassRoleSame serviceHijack SageMaker notebook via lifecycle configsagemaker:UpdateNotebookInstanceSame serviceHijack SageMaker notebook via presigned URLsagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrlSame servicePass role to SageMakeriam:PassRoleSame servicePass role to SageMaker processing jobiam:PassRoleSame servicePass role to SageMaker training jobiam:PassRole

References

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