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العربيةHijack SageMaker notebook via presigned URL
Can mint a presigned URL to a notebook and run a shell as its execution role.
Grants escalation on its own.
sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrlOn its own, sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl can mint a presigned URL to a notebook and run a shell as its execution role. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl on an existing notebook instance that runs as the target role, minting a signed URL that opens the notebook's Jupyter environment. Using Jupyter's built-in terminal, a shell running as the target role, the attacker reads the target role's live credentials or calls AWS directly. No iam:PassRole is needed, because the target role is already bound to the notebook. If the target role is privileged this is full privilege escalation against a notebook that was already trusted.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrlPrerequisites
An existing SageMaker notebook instance with an execution role; permission to create a presigned URL for it. The notebook must be InService to open the Jupyter session.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1578 · Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl to operators; reduce the notebook execution role's permissions.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl allow?
Can mint a presigned URL to a notebook and run a shell as its execution role.
Can sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is hijack SageMaker notebook via presigned URL detected?
Watch for CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl to operators; reduce the notebook execution role's permissions. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.