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العربيةDelete SCP
Can delete an SCP outright, removing its guardrail everywhere.
Grants escalation on its own.
organizations:DeletePolicyOn its own, organizations:DeletePolicy can delete an SCP outright, removing its guardrail everywhere. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call organizations:DeletePolicy to delete an SCP outright, removing its guardrail everywhere it was attached.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1562.001, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, under the defense evasion tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as DeletePolicy. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
DeletePolicyPrerequisites
organizations:DeletePolicy from the management or a delegated-admin account (SCP detached first).
Tactic
Defense Evasion
A control that would remove it: Restrict organizations:DeletePolicy to a break-glass management-account role.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does organizations:DeletePolicy allow?
Can delete an SCP outright, removing its guardrail everywhere.
Can organizations:DeletePolicy escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails with no other permission.
How is delete SCP detected?
Watch for DeletePolicy in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict organizations:DeletePolicy to a break-glass management-account role. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1562.001, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, under the defense evasion tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.