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العربيةDelete Config delivery channel
Can cut a Config recorder's S3/SNS delivery.
Grants escalation on its own.
config:DeleteDeliveryChannelOn its own, config:DeleteDeliveryChannel can cut a Config recorder's S3/SNS delivery. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call config:DeleteDeliveryChannel to sever where AWS Config ships its snapshots and notifications, so configuration history stops being persisted even if the recorder keeps running.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1562.001, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, under the defense evasion tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as DeleteDeliveryChannel. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
DeleteDeliveryChannelPrerequisites
config:DeleteDeliveryChannel on the account's delivery channel.
Tactic
Defense Evasion
A control that would remove it: Restrict config:DeleteDeliveryChannel to a break-glass role; deny via SCP (no resource-level scope, so the Deny must use Resource "*").
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does config:DeleteDeliveryChannel allow?
Can cut a Config recorder's S3/SNS delivery.
Can config:DeleteDeliveryChannel escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails with no other permission.
How is delete Config delivery channel detected?
Watch for DeleteDeliveryChannel in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict config:DeleteDeliveryChannel to a break-glass role; deny via SCP (no resource-level scope, so the Deny must use Resource "*"). Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1562.001, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, under the defense evasion tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.