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العربيةStop AWS Config recorder
Can stop an AWS Config recorder, ending configuration history.
Grants escalation on its own.
config:StopConfigurationRecorderOn its own, config:StopConfigurationRecorder can stop an AWS Config recorder, ending configuration history. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call config:StopConfigurationRecorder on the recorder, halting AWS Config's recording of resource configuration changes. Config rules stop evaluating and the configuration timeline goes blank, so subsequent changes leave no configuration-history trace even though CloudTrail may still record the API calls.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1562.001, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, under the defense evasion tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as StopConfigurationRecorder. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
StopConfigurationRecorderPrerequisites
config:StopConfigurationRecorder, which is only grantable account-wide (no resource-level scope).
Tactic
Defense Evasion
A control that would remove it: Restrict config:StopConfigurationRecorder to a break-glass role; deny it via SCP (the action has no resource-level scope, so the Deny must use Resource "*").
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does config:StopConfigurationRecorder allow?
Can stop an AWS Config recorder, ending configuration history.
Can config:StopConfigurationRecorder escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails with no other permission.
How is stop AWS Config recorder detected?
Watch for StopConfigurationRecorder in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict config:StopConfigurationRecorder to a break-glass role; deny it via SCP (the action has no resource-level scope, so the Deny must use Resource "*"). Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1562.001, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, under the defense evasion tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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