Grant org access via resource policy
Can grant an external/member principal management access to the org.
Grants escalation on its own.
organizations:PutResourcePolicyOn its own, organizations:PutResourcePolicy can grant an external/member principal management access to the org. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call organizations:PutResourcePolicy to grant an external or member principal management access to the organization via its resource policy.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as PutResourcePolicy. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
PutResourcePolicyPrerequisites
organizations:PutResourcePolicy from the management account.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1098 · Account ManipulationTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict organizations:PutResourcePolicy to a break-glass management-account role.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does organizations:PutResourcePolicy allow?
Can grant an external/member principal management access to the org.
Can organizations:PutResourcePolicy escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.
How is grant org access via resource policy detected?
Watch for PutResourcePolicy in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict organizations:PutResourcePolicy to a break-glass management-account role. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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