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العربيةSelf-grant secret read via resource policy
Can rewrite a secret's resource policy to grant itself read, then read it.
Grants escalation on its own.
secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicyOn its own, secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy can rewrite a secret's resource policy to grant itself read, then read it. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy on the secret to attach a resource policy granting itself (or the public) secretsmanager:GetSecretValue, then read the secret value. This bypasses the absence of an identity-policy read grant: the attacker rewrites the lock rather than holding a key. A secret frequently holds another principal's long-term credentials, so control of the policy becomes direct credential theft and a pivot to whatever identity the secret holds.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as PutResourcePolicy. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
PutResourcePolicyPrerequisites
secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy on the secret. The abuse additionally assumes no SCP/boundary/PrincipalOrgID guardrail blocks the over-grant, and (for a customer-managed CMK) kms:Decrypt on the encrypting key to read the value.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1098 · Account ManipulationTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy to secret admins; deny resource-policy writes via SCP; require aws:PrincipalOrgID on secret resource policies.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy allow?
Can rewrite a secret's resource policy to grant itself read, then read it.
Can secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.
How is self-grant secret read via resource policy detected?
Watch for PutResourcePolicy in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy to secret admins; deny resource-policy writes via SCP; require aws:PrincipalOrgID on secret resource policies. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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