Skip to content
PATHBREAK
Attack paths Compliance How it works Attack map Pricing Blog
EnglishEspañolFrançaisDeutsch日本語한국어العربية
Log in Request a demo
Attack paths Compliance How it works Attack map Pricing Blog
EnglishEspañolFrançaisDeutsch日本語한국어العربية
Log in Request a demo
The Pathbreak Attack Map for AWS / EventBridge
Resource exposure EventBridge T1190

Publicly writable EventBridge bus

An EventBridge bus policy grants Principal:* (public PutEvents)..

No IAM permission is needed. The exposure is in the resource's own configuration, so anyone the policy names, or everyone when it is public, can reach it.

Key takeaway

This is a configuration exposure, not a permission. An EventBridge bus policy grants Principal:* (public PutEvents). Anyone the policy allows, or everyone when it is public, can reach it with no IAM access of their own.

exposure reachable 01 Attacker principal 02 Resource 03 Public internet
How an attacker moves from this permission.
Explore this in Pathbreak

Why it is dangerous

An EventBridge bus accepts events from anyone; an attacker can inject events into the account's automation.

In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1190, Exploit Public-Facing Application, under the initial access tactic.

Detection

See CloudTrail management events.

Prerequisites

None beyond holding the permission.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing Application

Tactic

Initial Access

Breaking the path

A control that would remove it: Remove the public statement from the event-bus policy (events:RemovePermission).

Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.

Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.

Questions

What does this configuration allow?

An EventBridge bus policy grants Principal:* (public PutEvents).

Does this need any IAM permission?

No. It is a configuration exposure. Anyone the resource policy names, or everyone when it is public, can reach it without holding any permission of their own.

How is publicly writable EventBridge bus detected?

Watch for the related CloudTrail management events.

How do you break this path?

A control that would remove it is: Remove the public statement from the event-bus policy (events:RemovePermission). Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.

Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?

T1190, Exploit Public-Facing Application, under the initial access tactic.

Related paths

Same serviceSelf-grant EventBridge bus PutEventsevents:PutPermissionSame techniquePublic Lambda function URLLambda

Find this in your own account

We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.

Request a free scan Watch the 7-minute walkthrough
PATHBREAK

Validated AWS attack paths, and the change that breaks each one.

Platform

Overview Attack paths How it works Pricing Attack map Threat actors Demo pathbreak-audit

Company

About Request a demo hello@pathbreak.io

Registered office

60 High Street
Wimbledon
London, England
SW19 5EE

Pathbreak Ltd · Company No. 17265710
© 2026 Pathbreak Ltd. All rights reserved.
Terms Privacy Security Trust
pathbreak.io