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العربيةSelf-grant EventBridge bus PutEvents
Can grant an external account PutEvents on a bus, injecting events into automation.
Grants escalation on its own.
events:PutPermissionOn its own, events:PutPermission can grant an external account PutEvents on a bus, injecting events into automation. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call events:PutPermission to grant an external account PutEvents on the bus, injecting events into automation. Active counterpart to public-eventbridge-bus-policy.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as PutPermission. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
PutPermissionPrerequisites
events:PutPermission on the event bus; an attacker-controlled account to grant.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1098 · Account ManipulationTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict events:PutPermission on the event bus.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does events:PutPermission allow?
Can grant an external account PutEvents on a bus, injecting events into automation.
Can events:PutPermission escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.
How is self-grant EventBridge bus PutEvents detected?
Watch for PutPermission in CloudTrail. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict events:PutPermission on the event bus. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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