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العربيةPublicly accessible resource policy
A resource policy grants Principal:* with no narrowing condition..
No IAM permission is needed. The exposure is in the resource's own configuration, so anyone the policy names, or everyone when it is public, can reach it.
This is a configuration exposure, not a permission. A resource policy grants Principal:* with no narrowing condition. Anyone the policy allows, or everyone when it is public, can reach it with no IAM access of their own.
Why it is dangerous
This resource's policy grants Principal:* with no narrowing condition, so any anonymous internet party can use it directly.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1530, Data from Cloud Storage, under the collection tactic.
Detection
Prerequisites
None beyond holding the permission.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1530 · Data from Cloud StorageTactic
Collection
A control that would remove it: Remove the Principal:* grant or scope it (aws:SourceArn / aws:PrincipalOrgID / aws:SourceAccount).
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does this configuration allow?
A resource policy grants Principal:* with no narrowing condition.
Does this need any IAM permission?
No. It is a configuration exposure. Anyone the resource policy names, or everyone when it is public, can reach it without holding any permission of their own.
How is publicly accessible resource policy detected?
Watch for the related CloudTrail management events.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove the Principal:* grant or scope it (aws:SourceArn / aws:PrincipalOrgID / aws:SourceAccount). Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1530, Data from Cloud Storage, under the collection tactic.
Related paths
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.