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العربيةShare Aurora cluster snapshot out
Can share an Aurora cluster snapshot out to an attacker account.
Grants escalation on its own.
rds:ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttributeOn its own, rds:ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute can share an Aurora cluster snapshot out to an attacker account. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call rds:ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute to share an Aurora cluster the snapshot with an attacker account. The existing rds-snapshot-share rule covers only instance snapshots, so Aurora clusters are a blind spot today.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1537, Transfer Data to Cloud Account, under the exfiltration tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttributePrerequisites
rds:ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute on the cluster snapshot; an attacker-controlled account.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1537 · Transfer Data to Cloud AccountTactic
Exfiltration
A control that would remove it: Restrict rds:ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute on the cluster snapshot.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does rds:ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute allow?
Can share an Aurora cluster snapshot out to an attacker account.
Can rds:ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.
How is share Aurora cluster snapshot out detected?
Watch for ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict rds:ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute on the cluster snapshot. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1537, Transfer Data to Cloud Account, under the exfiltration tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.