Self-grant SNS topic access
Can add an attacker account to an SNS topic's policy, then read or inject.
Grants escalation on its own.
sns:AddPermissionOn its own, sns:AddPermission can add an attacker account to an SNS topic's policy, then read or inject. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call sns:AddPermission to add an external account to the topic's policy, then subscribe (read) or publish (inject). Active counterpart to public-sns-topic-policy - we detect the exposed topic today but not the identity that can create it.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as AddPermission. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
AddPermissionPrerequisites
sns:AddPermission on the topic; an attacker-controlled account to grant.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1098 · Account ManipulationTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict sns:AddPermission on the topic.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does sns:AddPermission allow?
Can add an attacker account to an SNS topic's policy, then read or inject.
Can sns:AddPermission escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.
How is self-grant SNS topic access detected?
Watch for AddPermission in CloudTrail. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict sns:AddPermission on the topic. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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