Skip to content
PATHBREAK
Attack paths Compliance How it works Attack map Pricing Blog
EnglishEspañolFrançaisDeutsch日本語한국어العربية
Log in Request a demo
Attack paths Compliance How it works Attack map Pricing Blog
EnglishEspañolFrançaisDeutsch日本語한국어العربية
Log in Request a demo
The Pathbreak Attack Map for AWS / SNS
Resource exposure SNS T1098 Persistence

Self-grant SNS topic access

Can add an attacker account to an SNS topic's policy, then read or inject.

Grants escalation on its own.

sns:AddPermission
Key takeaway

On its own, sns:AddPermission can add an attacker account to an SNS topic's policy, then read or inject. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.

AddPermission shares out to external 01 Attacker principal 02 Resource 03 Shared out 04 External account
How an attacker moves from this permission.
Explore this in Pathbreak

Why it is dangerous

A principal can call sns:AddPermission to add an external account to the topic's policy, then subscribe (read) or publish (inject). Active counterpart to public-sns-topic-policy - we detect the exposed topic today but not the identity that can create it.

In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as AddPermission. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.

Detection

AddPermission

Prerequisites

sns:AddPermission on the topic; an attacker-controlled account to grant.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1098 · Account Manipulation

Tactic

Privilege Escalation

Breaking the path

A control that would remove it: Restrict sns:AddPermission on the topic.

Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.

Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.

Questions

What does sns:AddPermission allow?

Can add an attacker account to an SNS topic's policy, then read or inject.

Can sns:AddPermission escalate privileges on its own?

Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.

How is self-grant SNS topic access detected?

Watch for AddPermission in CloudTrail. The call is quiet against normal activity, so it is easy to miss without a rule for it.

How do you break this path?

A control that would remove it is: Restrict sns:AddPermission on the topic. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.

Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?

T1098, Account Manipulation, under the privilege escalation tactic.

Related paths

Same servicePublicly accessible SNS topicSNSSame techniqueSelf-grant Lambda invoke via resource policylambda:AddPermissionSame techniqueSelf-grant S3 read via bucket policys3:PutBucketPolicySame techniqueSelf-grant KMS Decrypt via grantkms:CreateGrantSame techniqueSelf-grant KMS decrypt via key policykms:PutKeyPolicySame techniqueSelf-grant secret read via resource policysecretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy

References

  • https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/

Find this in your own account

We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.

Request a free scan Watch the 7-minute walkthrough
PATHBREAK

Validated AWS attack paths, and the change that breaks each one.

Platform

Overview Attack paths How it works Pricing Attack map Threat actors Demo pathbreak-audit

Company

About Request a demo hello@pathbreak.io

Registered office

60 High Street
Wimbledon
London, England
SW19 5EE

Pathbreak Ltd · Company No. 17265710
© 2026 Pathbreak Ltd. All rights reserved.
Terms Privacy Security Trust
pathbreak.io