English
Español
Français
Deutsch
日本語
한국어
العربيةRun command via SSM
Can run arbitrary commands on an instance via SSM.
Grants escalation on its own.
ssm:SendCommandOn its own, ssm:SendCommand can run arbitrary commands on an instance via SSM. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call ssm:SendCommand to run arbitrary commands on SSM-managed the instance without an interactive session, key pair, or open port. That is non-interactive code execution on the instance, letting the principal steal the instance's role credentials and pivot, the same control outcome as StartSession through a different API.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1651, Cloud Administration Command, under the lateral movement tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as SendCommand. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
SendCommandPrerequisites
Target instance runs the SSM agent and is registered (ssm-managed tag).
MITRE ATT&CK
T1651 · Cloud Administration CommandTactic
Lateral Movement
A control that would remove it: Restrict ssm:SendCommand to break-glass principals only.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does ssm:SendCommand allow?
Can run arbitrary commands on an instance via SSM.
Can ssm:SendCommand escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is run command via SSM detected?
Watch for SendCommand in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict ssm:SendCommand to break-glass principals only. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1651, Cloud Administration Command, under the lateral movement tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.