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العربيةHijack Batch job-definition role
Can submit a Batch job with an override command and run a container as its job role.
Grants escalation on its own.
batch:SubmitJobOn its own, batch:SubmitJob can submit a Batch job with an override command and run a container as its job role. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call batch:SubmitJob against an existing Batch job definition that already carries the job role, supplying a ContainerOverrides.Command whose shell command is attacker-controlled. Batch runs that command in a container as the target role, no iam:PassRole and no batch:RegisterJobDefinition needed, because the target role is already bound to the job definition. The command reads the target role's live credentials from the task-metadata endpoint or calls AWS directly; if the target role is privileged this is full privilege escalation against a job definition that was already trusted.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as SubmitJob. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
Detection
SubmitJobPrerequisites
An existing Batch job definition with a jobRoleArn; an accessible job queue; permission to submit a job. ContainerOverrides.Command must be permitted (the default).
MITRE ATT&CK
T1578 · Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict batch:SubmitJob on job queues/definitions that carry a privileged jobRoleArn; disallow ContainerOverrides.Command.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does batch:SubmitJob allow?
Can submit a Batch job with an override command and run a container as its job role.
Can batch:SubmitJob escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is hijack Batch job-definition role detected?
Watch for SubmitJob in CloudTrail. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict batch:SubmitJob on job queues/definitions that carry a privileged jobRoleArn; disallow ContainerOverrides.Command. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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