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العربيةHijack CodeDeploy target instance role
Can deploy a malicious revision and run a script as the target instances' role.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
codedeploy:CreateDeploymentcodedeploy:RegisterApplicationRevisioncodedeploy:CreateDeployment can deploy a malicious revision and run a script as the target instances' role, but only when it is held together with codedeploy:RegisterApplicationRevision. Held together they reach administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call codedeploy:CreateDeployment on an existing deployment group whose target EC2 instances already carry the instance-profile role, deploying a revision whose appspec.yml lifecycle hook runs an attacker shell script as root on those instances. The script reads the group's live credentials from IMDS, no iam:PassRole needed, because the group is already bound to the boxes. If the group is privileged this is full privilege escalation against instances that were already trusted.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateDeployment, RegisterApplicationRevision. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
Detection
CreateDeploymentRegisterApplicationRevisionPrerequisites
An existing deployment group targeting EC2 instances with an instance profile; the CodeDeploy agent running on them; an S3 bucket to stage the revision; permission to create a deployment. Appspec lifecycle hooks must be allowed (the default).
MITRE ATT&CK
T1578 · Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict codedeploy:CreateDeployment on deployment groups whose target instances carry a privileged instance profile; review appspec lifecycle hooks.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does codedeploy:CreateDeployment allow?
Can deploy a malicious revision and run a script as the target instances' role.
What else is needed for codedeploy:CreateDeployment to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with codedeploy:RegisterApplicationRevision. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is hijack CodeDeploy target instance role detected?
Watch for CreateDeployment, RegisterApplicationRevision in CloudTrail. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict codedeploy:CreateDeployment on deployment groups whose target instances carry a privileged instance profile; review appspec lifecycle hooks. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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