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العربيةPass role to EC2 fleet
Can launch an EC2 fleet with an instance profile and reach its IMDS credentials.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
iam:PassRoleec2:CreateFleetiam:PassRole can launch an EC2 fleet with an instance profile and reach its IMDS credentials, but only when it is held together with ec2:CreateFleet. Held together they reach administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call ec2:CreateFleet with a launch template carrying the instance-profile role, launching instances whose IMDS exposes the target role's credentials. Standard IMDS/user-data code-exec as the passed role.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578.002, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateFleet. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
CreateFleetPrerequisites
iam:PassRole for a role trusting ec2.amazonaws.com and a launch template with the instance profile.
Tactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Scope iam:PassRole for roles trusting ec2.amazonaws.com; restrict ec2:CreateFleet.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:PassRole allow?
Can launch an EC2 fleet with an instance profile and reach its IMDS credentials.
What else is needed for iam:PassRole to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with ec2:CreateFleet. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is pass role to EC2 fleet detected?
Watch for CreateFleet in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Scope iam:PassRole for roles trusting ec2.amazonaws.com; restrict ec2:CreateFleet. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578.002, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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