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العربيةInject user-data into EC2 launch template
Can inject user-data into a launch template, run as its role on next launch.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersionec2:ModifyLaunchTemplateec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion can inject user-data into a launch template, run as its role on next launch, but only when it is held together with ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate. Held together they reach administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion to publish a new version of an existing launch template carrying attacker-controlled user-data, then ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate to set that version as the default, no iam:PassRole needed. The template already references the instance-profile role, so any instance later launched from it (an Auto Scaling group scaling out, a fleet refresh, or a manual RunInstances) boots the attacker's user-data and runs it as the target role, exposing the target role's credentials via IMDS. If the target role is privileged this is full privilege escalation against a template that was already trusted. NOTE: execution is DEFERRED to a future launch from the template.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateLaunchTemplateVersion, ModifyLaunchTemplate. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
Detection
CreateLaunchTemplateVersionModifyLaunchTemplatePrerequisites
An existing launch template that references an instance-profile role; permission to create a new template version and modify the template's default version. Execution is DEFERRED: the role is controlled only once an instance is launched from the template (e.g. by an Auto Scaling group).
MITRE ATT&CK
T1578 · Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion and ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate on launch templates that reference a privileged instance-profile role; prefer immutable/source-controlled templates.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion allow?
Can inject user-data into a launch template, run as its role on next launch.
What else is needed for ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is inject user-data into EC2 launch template detected?
Watch for CreateLaunchTemplateVersion, ModifyLaunchTemplate in CloudTrail. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict ec2:CreateLaunchTemplateVersion and ec2:ModifyLaunchTemplate on launch templates that reference a privileged instance-profile role; prefer immutable/source-controlled templates. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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