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العربيةPass role to EKS node group
Can create an EKS managed node group whose EC2 node role creds are attacker-reachable.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
iam:PassRoleeks:CreateNodegroupiam:PassRole can create an EKS managed node group whose EC2 node role creds are attacker-reachable, but only when it is held together with eks:CreateNodegroup. Held together they reach administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call eks:CreateNodegroup passing the node role. The managed nodes are ordinary EC2 instances exposing the target role via IMDS, and node roles are frequently broad (ECR, CNI, SSM, plus app policies).
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578.002, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateNodegroup. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
CreateNodegroupPrerequisites
iam:PassRole for the node role trusting ec2.amazonaws.com and eks:CreateNodegroup on the cluster.
Tactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Scope iam:PassRole for the node role (trusts ec2.amazonaws.com); restrict eks:CreateNodegroup.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:PassRole allow?
Can create an EKS managed node group whose EC2 node role creds are attacker-reachable.
What else is needed for iam:PassRole to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with eks:CreateNodegroup. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is pass role to EKS node group detected?
Watch for CreateNodegroup in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Scope iam:PassRole for the node role (trusts ec2.amazonaws.com); restrict eks:CreateNodegroup. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578.002, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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