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العربيةPut inline role policy
Can write an inline admin policy directly onto a role.
Grants escalation on its own.
iam:PutRolePolicyOn its own, iam:PutRolePolicy can write an inline admin policy directly onto a role. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call iam:PutRolePolicy to write an inline policy onto the role, granting it any permissions, typically full admin. Once the principal can reach the target role (assume it, or steal its credentials via compute), the inline grant turns the target role into an administrator and persists until removed.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as PutRolePolicy. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
PutRolePolicyPrerequisites
A path to use the target role afterwards (assume-role or cred-theft).
Tactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Remove iam:PutRolePolicy from the principal.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:PutRolePolicy allow?
Can write an inline admin policy directly onto a role.
Can iam:PutRolePolicy escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is put inline role policy detected?
Watch for PutRolePolicy in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove iam:PutRolePolicy from the principal. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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