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العربيةPut inline user policy
Can write an inline admin policy directly onto a user.
Grants escalation on its own.
iam:PutUserPolicyOn its own, iam:PutUserPolicy can write an inline admin policy directly onto a user. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call iam:PutUserPolicy to write an inline policy directly onto the user, granting it any permissions it wants, typically a full administrator allow. If the target user is a user the principal controls (often itself), this is immediate self-promotion to admin and the granted policy persists until removed.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as PutUserPolicy. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
PutUserPolicyPrerequisites
Ability to act as the target user (e.g. it is the source principal).
Tactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Remove iam:PutUserPolicy from the principal.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:PutUserPolicy allow?
Can write an inline admin policy directly onto a user.
Can iam:PutUserPolicy escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is put inline user policy detected?
Watch for PutUserPolicy in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove iam:PutUserPolicy from the principal. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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