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العربيةAuthorize Redshift snapshot restore
Can authorize an attacker account to restore a Redshift snapshot.
Grants escalation on its own.
redshift:AuthorizeSnapshotAccessOn its own, redshift:AuthorizeSnapshotAccess can authorize an attacker account to restore a Redshift snapshot. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches access for an outside or public principal.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call redshift:AuthorizeSnapshotAccess to authorize an attacker account to restore the snapshot, yielding a full copy of the data warehouse. Active counterpart to the public-redshift-snapshot-shared exposure.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1537, Transfer Data to Cloud Account, under the exfiltration tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as AuthorizeSnapshotAccess. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
AuthorizeSnapshotAccessPrerequisites
redshift:AuthorizeSnapshotAccess on the snapshot; an attacker-controlled account to authorize.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1537 · Transfer Data to Cloud AccountTactic
Exfiltration
A control that would remove it: Restrict redshift:AuthorizeSnapshotAccess on the snapshot.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does redshift:AuthorizeSnapshotAccess allow?
Can authorize an attacker account to restore a Redshift snapshot.
Can redshift:AuthorizeSnapshotAccess escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches access for an outside or public principal with no other permission.
How is authorize Redshift snapshot restore detected?
Watch for AuthorizeSnapshotAccess in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict redshift:AuthorizeSnapshotAccess on the snapshot. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1537, Transfer Data to Cloud Account, under the exfiltration tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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