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العربيةHijack Step Functions state-machine role
Can rewrite a state machine and call AWS directly as its execution role.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
states:UpdateStateMachinestates:StartExecutionstates:UpdateStateMachine can rewrite a state machine and call AWS directly as its execution role, but only when it is held together with states:StartExecution. Held together they reach administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call states:UpdateStateMachine on an existing Step Functions state machine that already carries the execution role, replacing its ASL definition with one whose SDK-integration task calls AWS directly (e.g. iam:AttachUserPolicy), then states:StartExecution to run it. The task executes as the function, no iam:PassRole and no states:CreateStateMachine needed, because the function is already bound to the state machine. If the function is privileged this is full privilege escalation against a state machine that was already trusted.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as UpdateStateMachine, StartExecution. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
Detection
UpdateStateMachineStartExecutionPrerequisites
An existing state machine with an execution role; permission to update its definition and start an execution.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1578 · Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict states:UpdateStateMachine / states:StartExecution on state machines that carry a privileged execution role.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does states:UpdateStateMachine allow?
Can rewrite a state machine and call AWS directly as its execution role.
What else is needed for states:UpdateStateMachine to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with states:StartExecution. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is hijack Step Functions state-machine role detected?
Watch for UpdateStateMachine, StartExecution in CloudTrail. The call is loud in CloudTrail and stands out from normal activity.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict states:UpdateStateMachine / states:StartExecution on state machines that carry a privileged execution role. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1578, Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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