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العربيةPass role to EKS Pod Identity
Can bind a privileged role to an attacker pod via a new Pod Identity association.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
eks:CreatePodIdentityAssociationiam:PassRoleiam:PassRole can bind a privileged role to an attacker pod via a new Pod Identity association, but only when it is held together with eks:CreatePodIdentityAssociation. Held together they reach administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call eks:CreatePodIdentityAssociation to map the privileged role onto a service account it controls, then run a pod as that account to assume the target role through the EKS Pod Identity agent.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1078.004, Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreatePodIdentityAssociation. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
CreatePodIdentityAssociationPrerequisites
eks:CreatePodIdentityAssociation + iam:PassRole for a role trusting pods.eks.amazonaws.com, and pod-scheduling reach on the cluster.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1078.004 · Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsTactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Scope iam:PassRole for roles trusting pods.eks.amazonaws.com; restrict eks:CreatePodIdentityAssociation to cluster admins.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:PassRole allow?
Can bind a privileged role to an attacker pod via a new Pod Identity association.
What else is needed for iam:PassRole to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with eks:CreatePodIdentityAssociation. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is pass role to EKS Pod Identity detected?
Watch for CreatePodIdentityAssociation in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Scope iam:PassRole for roles trusting pods.eks.amazonaws.com; restrict eks:CreatePodIdentityAssociation to cluster admins. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1078.004, Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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