English
Español
Français
Deutsch
日本語
한국어
العربيةAdd self to privileged group
Can add itself to a privileged group and inherit its permissions.
Grants escalation on its own.
iam:AddUserToGroupOn its own, iam:AddUserToGroup can add itself to a privileged group and inherit its permissions. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call iam:AddUserToGroup to add itself (or a user it controls) to the privileged group, inheriting all of the group's permissions without touching any policy document. If the group already carries strong access this is instant privilege escalation, and the membership persists until revoked.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as AddUserToGroup. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
AddUserToGroupPrerequisites
A group that already holds privileged permissions; a user the attacker controls.
Tactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Remove iam:AddUserToGroup from the principal.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:AddUserToGroup allow?
Can add itself to a privileged group and inherit its permissions.
Can iam:AddUserToGroup escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is add self to privileged group detected?
Watch for AddUserToGroup in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove iam:AddUserToGroup from the principal. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.