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العربيةMint access key for user
Can mint a new long-lived access key for a user.
Grants escalation on its own.
iam:CreateAccessKeyOn its own, iam:CreateAccessKey can mint a new long-lived access key for a user. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches usable credentials.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call iam:CreateAccessKey to mint a brand-new long-lived access key for the user without knowing any of the target user's existing secrets. From then on the principal can authenticate the API as the target user with that key. The key is independent of the target user's other credentials, it survives a password reset or key rotation, so this is both an account-takeover and a durable persistence foothold.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials, under the persistence tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateAccessKey. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
CreateAccessKeyPrerequisites
Target user may have fewer than the 2-key limit (otherwise the call fails).
Tactic
Persistence
A control that would remove it: Remove iam:CreateAccessKey from the principal.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:CreateAccessKey allow?
Can mint a new long-lived access key for a user.
Can iam:CreateAccessKey escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches usable credentials with no other permission.
How is mint access key for user detected?
Watch for CreateAccessKey in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove iam:CreateAccessKey from the principal. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials, under the persistence tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.