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العربيةRotate access key to mint credentials for user
Can rotate out a key to mint a new access key for a user.
Grants escalation only in combination. All of these are needed together:
iam:CreateAccessKeyiam:DeleteAccessKeyiam:CreateAccessKey can rotate out a key to mint a new access key for a user, but only when it is held together with iam:DeleteAccessKey. Held together they reach usable credentials.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call iam:DeleteAccessKey to remove one of the user's existing access keys and then iam:CreateAccessKey to mint a brand-new long-lived key under the principal's control, without knowing any of the target user's secrets. Unlike plain key minting, the added delete bypasses AWS's two-access-key-per-user limit, so this works even when the target user already holds the maximum of two keys. From then on the principal authenticates the API as the target user; the new key is independent of the target user's other credentials, so it is both an account takeover and a durable persistence foothold.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials, under the persistence tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateAccessKey, DeleteAccessKey. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
CreateAccessKeyDeleteAccessKeyPrerequisites
Holds iam:DeleteAccessKey as well as iam:CreateAccessKey, so it works even when the target user already has the 2-key maximum (where plain CreateAccessKey would fail).
Tactic
Persistence
A control that would remove it: Remove iam:CreateAccessKey and iam:DeleteAccessKey from the principal.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:CreateAccessKey allow?
Can rotate out a key to mint a new access key for a user.
What else is needed for iam:CreateAccessKey to be dangerous?
It becomes an escalation only when held together with iam:DeleteAccessKey. On its own it is not enough, which is what makes the combination easy to miss.
How is rotate access key to mint credentials for user detected?
Watch for CreateAccessKey, DeleteAccessKey in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove iam:CreateAccessKey and iam:DeleteAccessKey from the principal. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials, under the persistence tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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