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العربيةReset console password for user
Can reset a user's console password and take it over.
Grants escalation on its own.
iam:UpdateLoginProfileOn its own, iam:UpdateLoginProfile can reset a user's console password and take it over. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches usable credentials.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call iam:UpdateLoginProfile to reset the console password of the user that already has one, locking in a password the principal controls and gaining interactive console access as the target user. Same takeover outcome as creating a profile, for a user that already had console access.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials, under the persistence tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as UpdateLoginProfile. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
UpdateLoginProfilePrerequisites
Target user already has a login profile to update.
Tactic
Persistence
A control that would remove it: Remove iam:UpdateLoginProfile from the principal.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:UpdateLoginProfile allow?
Can reset a user's console password and take it over.
Can iam:UpdateLoginProfile escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches usable credentials with no other permission.
How is reset console password for user detected?
Watch for UpdateLoginProfile in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove iam:UpdateLoginProfile from the principal. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098.001, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials, under the persistence tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
We run a read-only scan of one AWS account and show you which of these paths exist, ranked by blast radius, with the change that breaks each one. First validated paths within the hour.