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العربيةStrip MFA from user
Can remove the MFA device from a user, weakening it for takeover.
Grants escalation on its own.
iam:DeactivateMFADeviceOn its own, iam:DeactivateMFADevice can remove the MFA device from a user, weakening it for takeover. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call iam:DeactivateMFADevice on the user, removing the MFA requirement on that identity. Combined with a password reset or access-key mint this turns a partially-protected account into a fully usable one.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1556.006, Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication, under the defense evasion tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as DeactivateMFADevice. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
Detection
DeactivateMFADevicePrerequisites
iam:DeactivateMFADevice on the user.
Tactic
Defense Evasion
A control that would remove it: Remove iam:DeactivateMFADevice from the principal; restrict MFA administration to a break-glass role and alarm on the event.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does iam:DeactivateMFADevice allow?
Can remove the MFA device from a user, weakening it for takeover.
Can iam:DeactivateMFADevice escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches blinded detection or removed guardrails with no other permission.
How is strip MFA from user detected?
Watch for DeactivateMFADevice in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Remove iam:DeactivateMFADevice from the principal; restrict MFA administration to a break-glass role and alarm on the event. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1556.006, Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication, under the defense evasion tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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