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العربيةAssign self to admin permission set
Can assign a principal to an already-provisioned admin permission set.
Grants escalation on its own.
sso:CreateAccountAssignmentOn its own, sso:CreateAccountAssignment can assign a principal to an already-provisioned admin permission set. On a wide resource scope that alone reaches administrator access.
Why it is dangerous
A principal can call sso:CreateAccountAssignment to bind an attacker-controlled principal to permission the set in a target account. If that set is already provisioned as an admin (e.g. AdministratorAccess), the assignment hands the attacker a federated admin role with no policy edit at all - the cleanest real-world Identity Center privesc.
In MITRE ATT&CK terms this maps to T1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, under the privilege escalation tactic. AWS records it in CloudTrail as CreateAccountAssignment. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out. It also gives an attacker a way to keep access after the first foothold is closed, so it is worth watching even when it looks like routine administration.
Detection
CreateAccountAssignmentPrerequisites
An already-provisioned privileged permission set, and a principal the attacker controls to assign it to.
Tactic
Privilege Escalation
A control that would remove it: Restrict sso:CreateAccountAssignment to a break-glass Identity Center admin; alarm on new assignments to privileged permission sets.
Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your environment, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix. The same permission can be load-bearing in one account and pure risk in another.
Pathbreak confirms whether this path resolves in your account, ranks it against the others by how much it opens up, and uses your threat model and business context to show which paths are worth cutting.
Questions
What does sso:CreateAccountAssignment allow?
Can assign a principal to an already-provisioned admin permission set.
Can sso:CreateAccountAssignment escalate privileges on its own?
Yes. Held on a broad enough resource it reaches administrator access with no other permission.
How is assign self to admin permission set detected?
Watch for CreateAccountAssignment in CloudTrail. The call shows up in CloudTrail but blends into normal administration, so it needs a rule to stand out.
How do you break this path?
A control that would remove it is: Restrict sso:CreateAccountAssignment to a break-glass Identity Center admin; alarm on new assignments to privileged permission sets. Whether to apply it depends on how the permission is used in your account, so it is a business decision rather than an automatic fix.
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique is this?
T1098.003, Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles, under the privilege escalation tactic.
Related paths
References
Find this in your own account
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